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A B S T R A C T
Fiscal sociology has alleged the existence of a mutually reinforcing effect
between the emergence of representative government and effective taxation.
This paper looks at Benin, a low-income country that successfully democratised
in the early s. It ﬁnds that Benin appears to have reinforced its extractive
capacities since democratisation. However, the effect of democratisation has
been indirect, while the inﬂuence of the International Financial Institutions
(IFI) and the size of the country’s informal sector have played a more direct
role. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that effective taxation is based on a quasi-
consensual relationship between the state and the taxpayers ﬁnds some
conﬁrmation.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The development of effective taxation systems has been regarded as a
crucial phase in the process of statebuilding. Focusing on the historical
European experience, ﬁscal sociology has emphasised the connection
between political representation and taxation (Moore ) and high-
lighted the emergence of a twofold process of institutional development
and reinforcement of state accountability around the issue of revenue
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collection (Brautigam ). Although the traditional argument points
to the positive effect of broad-based taxes on political representation, a
symmetrical argument has also been made, stating that citizens would be
more willing to pay taxes to a more legitimate and responsive
government.
As democracy diffuses around the globe, even to the poorest parts of
the world, it is worth asking what effects democratisation is having on the
extractive capacities of developing states, and if it is fostering a social bar-
gaining process between taxpayers and the state. This article explores
the impact of democratisation and democracy on a state’s extractive cap-
acity by looking at the evolution of the Beninese tax revenues and ﬁscal
system. Benin, a small country born out of decolonisation, with a fragile
economy and a heritage of administrative weakness, is a good case study
for exploring the interaction between democracy, taxation and
statebuilding.
The analysis conﬁrms that several theoretical hypotheses inspired by
the history of Western Europe are not applicable to contemporary devel-
oping countries such as Benin. It also argues, however, that a democratic
environment may have a positive effect in enhancing effective taxation
and reinforcing its statebuilding potential through different causal
mechanisms.
T A X A T I O N , D E M O C R A C Y A N D S T A T E B U I L D I N G I N H I S T O R I C A L
A N D C O N T E M P O R A R Y P E R S P E C T I V E
The power of collecting taxes has often been presented as one of the
core, deﬁning features of a modern state (North ; Levi ;
Tilly, ). The politico-economic approach to the study of taxation
has considered the capacity of states to tax their citizens as both a
central phase in the process of statebuilding and a key indicator of the
capacities and consolidation of a nation state (Bates and Lien ;
Levi ; Tilly ; Lieberman ; Di John ).
Since the writings of Joseph Schumpeter () a central tenet of
ﬁscal sociology has been that there is a causal connection between the
dependence of governments on broadly levied taxes and the existence
of binding constraints on governments and institutionalised political re-
presentation (Moore : ). The ‘tax state’ – a state that relies on
broadly levied taxes as its prime source of ﬁnancing – will tend toward
accountable, representative government.
The core assumption of the ﬁscal sociology approach is that taxes can
be extracted in two ways: through coercion, or in a semi-consensual way
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that requires the cooperation of the taxpayer. Examples of coercive tax-
ation are poll taxes historically levied in agrarian societies and in many
countries under colonial rule, which did not differentiate between tax-
payers’ capacities to pay. Although the coercive collection of taxes is
easier from an administrative point of view, it tends to generate resist-
ance and non-compliance on the part of taxpayers and to be thus inefﬁ-
cient. Thus, these taxes are labelled ‘low quality’ taxes. Taxes that are
collected at speciﬁc points, such as custom duties, are also assumed to
be relatively easy to collect. However, they have less perverse effects
than poll taxes and can be designed in a way to have some moderate re-
distributive effect (Lieberman ). Progressive and administratively
sophisticated forms of taxation, such as direct taxes on income and
proﬁts, are more efﬁcient and more equitable, and are thus considered
‘high quality’ taxes, but require ﬁne-grained information on social and
economic activities that cannot be obtained by coercion alone. Thus,
these taxes tend to stimulate the development of a state’s administrative
apparatus.
The ﬁscal sociology approach emphasises not so much the quantita-
tive expansion of ﬁscal revenues but rather the structural transformation
of taxation systems. ‘High quality’ taxes would be particularly appropri-
ate for spurring a dual process of statebuilding and reinforcement of
state accountability (Lieberman ; Brautigam ; Baskaran &
Bigsten, ). The introduction of these taxes would encourage citi-
zens in pushing for government accountability and representation.
Since effective tax collection requires a high level of compliance on
the part of the taxpayers, governments would have to be responsive to
citizens’ demands (Schumpeter ; Bates & Lien ; Levi ;
Moore ).
A subsequent causal relationship would link taxation and statebuild-
ing. Higher levels of taxation extracted by consent can ﬁnance state-
provided services and goods. Moreover, the process of effective tax
collection itself, because of its administrative sophistication, will
further stimulate the development of state capabilities (Moore ;
Brautigam ).
Taxation would reinforce accountability, but the causal relationship
would also go in the other way, with accountable and representative gov-
ernance facilitating effective tax collection. Two causal arguments have
been advanced in order to argue that the introduction of forms of demo-
cratic representation would produce ‘better funded states’ (Schmitter
: ). First, in a virtuous circle, citizens will be more willing to pay
taxes to a government in which they feel represented and that they
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see as responsive to their needs (Bird ). Because of the crucial
importance of citizens’ compliance for ‘high quality’ taxation, govern-
ments that are authoritarian and unresponsive to citizens’ needs
would be handicapped in expanding it. Given the fact that they enjoy
more legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, and that they are usually
under pressure for redistributing wealth, democracies may have the
upper hand in employing taxation as a statebuilding mechanism over au-
tocracies. Second, in a context of democratic politics, political parties
and civil society actors would push for redistributive policies, which
require higher levels of taxation (Cheibub ).
The threefold link between democracy, taxation and statebuilding has
been emphasised by historical accounts focusing on Europe and Great
Britain in particular (Levi ; North & Weingast ; Hoffman &
Norberg ). However, the proposition that democracy enhances
tax collection has been theoretically and empirically contested with
respect to contemporary democratic and authoritarian countries.
Rational choice theorists have argued that citizens in a democratic
system will vote for lower taxation. On the other hand, since they are
less dependent on tax payer supports, autocratic government would
impose higher levels of taxes (Olson ; Mulligan et al. ). Since
these theories concentrate on states’ preferences and pay little attention
to the actual capacity to collect taxes, other authors have argued that
preferences and capacities would compensate for each other and the
effect of political regime would be thus undetermined (Cheibub
; Schmitter ).
A number of cross-country quantitative studies have been conducted
in order to test different theories of tax extraction and compare the tax-
ation performances of democracies and autocracies. However, they
reach contradictory conclusions, with some scholars ﬁnding that democ-
racies collect more taxes than non-democratic states (Boix ; Thies
: ), others that they collect as much taxes as autocracies
(Cheibub ; Schmitter : ) and others that they collect less
(Mulligan et al. ). Most of these studies do not distinguish
between ‘low quality’ and ‘high quality’ forms of taxation, and are
thus of limited utility in analysing taxation from a statebuilding angle.
Moreover, it has been argued that taking the history of the develop-
ment of taxation in Europe as a point of departure for analysing
revenue collection in contemporary developing countries could be in-
appropriate (Moore ). In these countries, the experience of coloni-
alism (Mkandawire ) and the forces of a globalised economy
(Moore ) would shape state-society relations in distinctive ways.
 G I U L I A P I C C O L I N O
The next section looks at the problem of taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa,
questioning the impact of the introduction of democracy on taxation in
this particular historical and geographic context.
D E M O C R A C Y , T A X A T I O N A N D A I D D E P E N D E N C Y I N S U B - S A H A R A N
A F R I C A
The relation between democracy and state capacity is particularly im-
portant today, as some of the poorest and weakest countries of the
world have adopted democratic institutions. In many of these countries,
encouraging democratisation has been seen not only as an end in itself
but also as a means to improve the way they are governed. The problem
is particularly relevant for Sub-Saharan Africa as, since independence,
most African states have been affected by diffuse problems such as wide-
spread corruption, poor economic management and political instability,
and have experienced periodic ﬁscal crises.
In spite of their general administrative weaknesses, African states
differ widely in their capacities to extract taxes. The tax systems of
most Sub-Saharan African states were ﬁrst established under colonialism
(Fjeldstad et al. ), and it has been argued that the mode of econom-
ic exploitation of African colonies has had a substantial effect on today’s
African states’ extractive capacities (Mkandawire ). Labour reserve
economies would have allowed for the emergence of relatively strong
states with high extractive capacities (Mkandawire : ). On
the other hand, former cash crop economies, a category that encom-
passes most of the former French and British colonies of West Africa,
would experience more difﬁculties in collecting taxes today
(Mkandawire : ). They generally present lower levels of indus-
trialisation and higher levels of informalisation of the economy with
respect to former labour reserves and tend to collect more trade taxes
and fewer direct taxes.
Since the end of the Cold War several former cash crop economies,
such as Benin, Senegal and Ghana, have undertaken a fairly successful
transition to democracy. If the hypothesis of the existence of a ‘virtuous
circle’ between effective taxation and representative government is
correct, democracy may have helped these countries in overcoming a
negative historical legacy. Stimulated by citizens’ demands for more
equitable taxation and better services, these states would have developed
more sophisticated and efﬁcient taxation systems, reinforcing their ad-
ministrative capacities in the process. However, the possibility that dem-
ocracy may have had a positive effect is complicated by the fact that many
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former cash crop economies have a long history of dependence on rents
(Clapham ; Bayart ).
Rents are ‘unearned’ income, which typically do not require high ad-
ministrative capacities, nor a bargaining process with citizens (Karl
; Ross , ; Moore ). Much scholarly attention has
been devoted to natural resource rents, particularly oil (Ross ,
; Jensen & Wantchenkon ). However, especially in low
income countries, strategic rents have long played a crucial role
(Moore : ). In the post Cold War era, development aid has
become arguably the most important strategic rent available to poor
countries and many institutionally weak and natural resource-poor
African countries have become heavily dependent on it (Brautigam
; Moore ; Moss et al. ).
Concerns have been raised that aid might undermine the ‘social con-
tract’ that is believed to stem from broad-based taxation (Moss et al.
; Knack ). However, the modalities of disbursement of devel-
opment aid makes it sensibly different from natural resource rents
(Collier ) and donors are making aid disbursement increasingly
conditional on the capacity of the state to increase its own revenues.
Even authors who claim that a correlation between high levels of aid
and low levels of taxes has been established, recognise that low tax
levels in aid-dependent states might be caused by factors that simultan-
eously determine both (Moss et al. ). Others claim that there is
no evidence of aid harming tax collection efforts (Di John : ).
Moreover, from an institution-building perspective, the fact that aid
might displace taxes may not always be a problem. Deterioration in
the quality of tax administration and policy would be a more worrying
indicator (Knack ). To date, there exists only one large-N study
about the relation between aid and extractive capacities deﬁned in
these terms and, while it seems to conﬁrm the existence of the ‘aid
curse’, it is based on World Bank indicators available only for a relatively
short number of years (Knack ).
The impact of aid rents need to be taken into account when exploring
the relation between democratisation and taxation as, at least in prin-
ciple, since the end of the Cold War donors have made aid available
to democratising states on a privileged basis. Although some authors
dispute the association of aid with democracy (Djankov et al. ), at
least two cross-country studies based on African data have found a correl-
ation between aid dependency and democratisation (Jensen &
Wantchekon ; Pfeiffer & Englebert ). In particular, Pfeiffer
and Englebert argue that the relative importance of aid vis-à-vis other
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strategic rents (what they call ‘extraversion portfolio’) has been a major
determinant of democratisation in Africa (Pfeiffer & Englebert ).
Low-income countries that are poor in natural resources, are not key se-
curity players and have weak links to foreign patrons need to show some
commitment to democratic reforms in order to attract aid ﬂows that they
are unable to substitute with other rents. From a political economy per-
spective, aid-dependent countries may become ‘democratic rentier
states’, using their status of ‘democratic successes’ to attract even
more aid (Bierschenk ). In this way, the virtuous circle that was sup-
posed to link taxation and democracy in the ﬁscal sociology literature is
undermined, and we might expect both a quantitative and qualitative
deterioration of taxation following a transition to democracy.
B E N I N : F R O M F I S C A L C R I S I S T O D E M O C R A T I S A T I O N
A small coastal state of West Africa, Benin provides a good case study for
investigating the relation between democratisation and extractive cap-
acities in Sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons. A former French
colony and cash crop economy, Benin is a resource-poor country, with
a weak economy and a large part of the population employed in subsist-
ence agriculture and small-scale informal trade. In spite of these handi-
caps, Benin holds at least one record, as it was the ﬁrst former French
Sub-Saharan African colony to start a successful democratisation
process at the beginning of the s. In particular, its formula of con-
vening a National Conference to manage the transition to democracy
has provided a model of political liberalisation for the rest of French-
speaking Africa (Heilbrunn ; Banégas ; Gazibo ;
Gisselquist ).
Benin’s ﬁscal system was ﬁrst established under colonial rule. After the
country gained independence in  under the name of Dahomey, a
series of reforms ofﬁcially abolished the colonial ﬁscal system.
However, these reforms were partial: they suppressed the most repres-
sive practices, such as poll taxes, but did not restructure the Beninese
ﬁscal system in depth (Raynaud et al. ). The single-party Marxist-
Leninist regime of Mathieu Kérékou, which lasted from  to ,
did not undertake any major reform in the domain of tax policy and ad-
ministration. Thus, taxation, especially internal taxation, remained
underdeveloped. In , at the eve of democratisation, the Beninese
state collected less than % of its gross national product (GNP) in in-
ternal taxes (excluding custom duties and other taxes on international
trade). While most analyses have concentrated on the spending side,
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the weakness of the Beninese revenue collection system was arguably
one of the causes for the ﬁscal crisis that affected the Kérékou regime
in the s (Allen ; Banégas ; Gisselquist ; Bierschenk
). Public debt accumulated and, by the end of the s, the state
was so bankrupt that it could not pay its employees’ salaries (Allen
). Democratisation in Benin was also a response to the state’s
ﬁnancial failure. It is worth asking if it has resulted in a better-funded
state and has made a ﬁscal crisis unlikely to happen in Benin again.
Several authors have deplored the fact that democratic Benin is still
affected by several governance problems, such as diffuse electoral clien-
telism (Wantchekon ), extensive corruption (Bako-Arifari ;
Blundo & Olivier de Sardan ) and a heritage of weak institutional
capacities (Olivier de Sardan ; Bierschenk ). It has been con-
tended that the country’s dependence on external rents is one of the
main causes of Benin’s problems (Bierschenk ). The so-called
Renouveau Démocratique – the regime change of  – would have
in the end reinforced the trend towards rentierism, by encouraging
the inﬂux of aid (Bierschenk : ).
If democracy has reinforced rentierism, however, we should expect
tax revenues to have stagnated or even shrunk since democratisation
and aid dependency to have increased. We should also expect no sign-
iﬁcant change or a negative change in the quality of taxation.
Data on revenues collected since the Renouveau Démocratique appear
to contradict the hypothesis that democracy has reinforced rentierism
and dependence on aid in Benin (Figure ). The increase in tax revenues
is one of the clearest trends. In , Benin’s tax to gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio was ·%. In , it had risen to ·%,
which represented a fall with respect to ﬁgures from , when the
country achieved its best performance of ·%. The country is today
in line with the % tax ratio target recommended by the World Bank
for low income countries (Gupta & Tareq ). Analyses based on tax
effort, rather than on the tax ratio, have even found Benin to slightly
over-perform (Sen Gupta ; Mkandawire ).
Moreover, Benin appears to have reduced its dependence on aid since
the early s. In , at the beginning of the Renouveau
Démocratique, the country received an amount of aid representing
·% of its gross national income (GNI) and it has been argued
that the massive inﬂux of aid substantially contributed to democratisa-
tion (Gazibo : ). However, the prime de la démocratie has tended
to dry up over the years, due to donor fatigue and increasing frustration
with the country’s levels of corruption and public mismanagement.
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Benin still receives considerable aid ﬂow and remains dependent on aid
for many important state investments (Gazibo ) but its level of aid
dependency has to be put into the context of West Africa, where it is far
from exceptional (Figure ). Moreover, when seen in a comparative per-
spective, Benin’s level of aid dependency seems to have little to do with
the democratic transition experienced by the country, as authoritarian
or semi-authoritarian West African states have analogous or superior
ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA)/GNI ratios. A particularly signiﬁ-
cant example of the latter is Togo, the West African country more easily
comparable to Benin in terms of size, population and economic struc-
ture (Figure ).
Benin is in fact often cited as an example of an African state with
an essentially ﬁscal budget (Bako Arifari ). The attitude of
Beninese government elites and civil servants is shaped by this ack-
nowledgement and there is a diffuse feeling among Beninese civil
servants, as well as consultants and donors, that the country’s tax
budget represents its most important source of revenues (Senior tax
ofﬁcer A  Int.).
Benin’s expansion of tax revenues looks less impressive in qualitative
terms, as the country has yet to fully overcome its dependence on ‘low
FIGURE 
Evolution of tax revenues in Benin (in Tax/Gross Domestic Product ratio).
Source: Author elaboration from Direction Générale des Impôts et de
Domaines (DGID) and Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects
(DGDDI), Benin.
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quality’ custom taxes. International trade taxes have constantly repre-
sented more than half of total tax revenues. However, internal
revenue mobilisation has also risen, from ·% in  to ·% in
 (Figure ). Custom taxes in Benin are often seen as stemming
from ‘unproductive’ speculative activities because part of them is
levied on goods imported in Benin and then re-exported – often by
smuggling – towards Nigeria. The existence and the lucrative character
of this business, however, has been made possible in the past by the dif-
ferences in Benin’s and Nigeria’s trade and monetary policies (Igué &
Soule ). With the introduction of the ECOWAS custom union
this year the situation could change. Another reduction in international
trade taxes is likely to stem from the parallel implementation of the
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU (Busse &
Großmann ; Bilal et al. ). Thus, there is a growing pressure
on the government to ﬁnd a replacement for the potential loss of
custom revenues.
FIGURE 
Benin’s aid dependency in the regional context of West Africa (ECOWAS
members plus Mauritania). Benin ODA/Gross National Income (GNI)
ratio is compared to Togo and to the average ODA/GNI of West Africa.
Liberia and Sierra Leone, because of their status of post-conﬂict countries,
received much higher ratios of external aid in the last two decades than any
other West African countries, so the graphic also includes the average
without these two outliers. Source: Author elaboration from World
Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank.
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In conclusion, looking at the quantitative trends, democratisation
does not appear to have had the harmful consequences on revenue col-
lection in Benin predicted by some specialists (Bierschenk ). It is,
however, more difﬁcult to see if there has been a causal relationship
between the expansion of revenues that has taken place since the
s in Benin and democratisation and, in particular, if democracy
has favoured the emergence of some kind of ‘social bargaining’
between taxpayers and the state. Given that many different historical
developments have affected Benin at the same time, indicators of the
amount of tax collected are insufﬁcient to determine which causal pro-
cesses mattered and which did not. The next two sections rely on inter-
views with Beninese stakeholders, including tax ofﬁcials, representatives
of taxpayers’ organisations and members of parliament, in order to
understand the process that has determined Benin’s expansion of
state revenues and its limits.
D E M O C R A T I C S O C I A L C O N T R A C T V E R S U S T E C H N O C R A T I C
R E F O R M
The global tax reform agenda in Benin
Theories of state rentierism point to the harmful role of globalisation for
taxation. However, other global processes that could have an opposite
effect on tax extraction have occurred in the post-Cold War years. The
most important alternative explanation for Benin’s expansion of tax rev-
enues points to the role of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs),
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional orga-
nisations such as the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
(UEMOA). Spearheaded by the IMF, a global tax reform agenda has
developed, aiming at making taxation a more simple and effective
process. This agenda has been supported by an ‘increasingly organized
epistemic community’ (Fjeldstad & Moore : ) of international
bureaucrats and national tax ofﬁcials, which has been highly inﬂuential
thanks to its cohesion, its highly specialised expertise and its capacity to
present its agenda as coherent and easily understandable.
The impact of tax reform is cited as one of the main determinants
of the improvements in Benin’s extractive capacities by Beninese
tax ofﬁcials. They point out that the largest increase in the tax ratio in
Benin happened in the early s, when the new elected government
of Nicéphore Soglo implemented the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) agreed with the IFIs. Some tax reforms concerned
ﬁscal policy: the most important was the introduction of value added
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tax (VAT) in . Other new taxes included a tax on industrial proﬁts
and commercial proﬁts and a tax on non-commercial proﬁts (Senior tax
ofﬁcer A  Int.; Secretary of employer association  Int.). Other
reforms addressed the way taxes were collected and introduced admin-
istrative rationalisation, for instance the attribution between  and
 of tax collection competences to the Direction Générale des
Impôts et de Domaines (DGID, Directorate General of National
Revenues and State-owned Estates) (Senior tax ofﬁcer B  Int.).
Benin’s ﬁscal reforms were among the ﬁrst undertaken by a
Francophone African country and served as a model for other countries
(Fossat and Bua : ). IMF technical assistance is now channelled
through the African Technical Assistance Center (AFRITAC) estab-
lished in Bamako in June . Since its creation in , UEMOA
has partially taken over the IMF’s role of driver of ﬁscal reforms.
UEMOA has imposed a common external tariff in the framework of
its custom union and has launched a programme of ﬁscal harmonisa-
tion. Benin pre-dated UEMOA on the implementation of some
reforms on its agenda, such as the introduction of VAT. On the other
hand, tax ofﬁcials are currently discussing how to implement the 
UEMOA’s Fiscal Transition Program (PTF) (UEMOA ), which
aims to gradually shift the tax burden from customs duties to domestic
taxes.
The main protagonists of the ﬁrst ﬁscal reforms were national and
international bureaucrats, notably the staff of the DGID, and the IFIs
(Senior tax ofﬁcer A  Int.). Reforms were adopted by the
Nicéphore Soglo elected government in a top-down technocratic
fashion, rather than through an open democratic debate. This attitude
was justiﬁed by the situation of emergency caused by the dimensions of
the ﬁscal crisis (Senior tax ofﬁcer A  Int.). Even at a later stage,
Benin’s debate on taxation has been dominated by internal and external
experts.
Because the expansion of ﬁscal revenues in Benin has happened
mostly through top-down technocratic reforms and as a consequence
of the expansion of the formal private sector, its statebuilding impact
has been relatively modest, as current evidence on the spread of corrup-
tion and political clientelism suggests. While the upward trend in the col-
lection of taxes is in itself beneﬁcial, it does not appear to have
substantially altered Benin’s mode of governance and to have put in
motion a ‘virtuous circle’ of reinforcement of the state and of its ac-
countability. This conclusion conﬁrms the ﬁndings of case studies of
other countries, where the expansion of central state revenues
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through the implementation of externally sponsored technocratic
reform has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale (Soest
; Soest et al. ).
The next section addresses the question of why democratisation has
mattered relatively little. It does so by looking at the role of institutiona-
lised political representation. While classical theories suggest that
elected parliaments are key fora where taxpayers and governments
develop a ‘social contract’, the Beninese parliament appears to have
been able to play this role only to a limited extent.
The marginal role of institutional representation
The transition to democracy has turned the Beninese parliament into an
elected body and has attributed to it a role of control on ﬁscal policy,
which is exercised mainly through the annual vote of the budget law.
While the parliament has been occasionally successful at advocating
minor amendments to the budget law, it has never managed to set the
agenda and, particularly during the s, has failed repeatedly in its
effort to impose on the government a major revision of its ﬁscal policy
orientations. A series of factors have indeed negatively affected the cap-
acity of the parliament to inﬂuence policy in general and ﬁscal policy in
particular.
In their detailed analysis of parliamentary control in Benin, Francis
Akindés and Victor Topanou () point at four sources of limitation.
First, the Constitutional and legislative architecture of the Republic of
Benin institutionalises a strong presidential regime and sets several im-
portant legal limits to the power of the parliament, in particular in the
domain of economic policy. Second, the inﬂuence of the IFIs and exter-
nal donors has undermined the parliament’s inﬂuence. Third, the par-
liament has insufﬁcient human and technical resources to scrutinise
properly the action of the government. Fourth, corruption and neo-
patrimonial politics have hampered the parliament’s ability to play its
role in full.
These four factors have interacted and reinforced each other.
According to the law, the Beninese national assembly votes on the
budget law and can propose amendments, but cannot alter the budget
equilibrium and has to ﬁnd alternative resources to ﬁnance possible
tax cuts. Article  of the Beninese constitution imposes the most insidi-
ous limitation on the inﬂuence of the parliament. It stipulates that the
president of the Republic can bypass the parliament and take exception-
al measures in a number of circumstances, including when the
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execution of international commitments is threatened in a serious and
immediate manner.
Article  has had important implications in Benin, as the most serious
clashes between the parliament and the government on economic and
ﬁscal matters have revolved around the implementation of international
commitments: the SAPs. In  and , the parliament refused to
vote for the budget law, opposing potentially unpopular austerity mea-
sures and privatisations. Interpreting article  in a broad fashion, the gov-
ernment and the president repeatedly won the battle, forcing the hand of
the parliament and passing the budget law by decree.
In Benin, as in other countries, the growing technical complexity of
tax policy has also negatively affected the parliament’s inﬂuence. The
parliament enjoys insufﬁcient support on technical issues (Beninese
Member of Parliament A  Int.; Akindés & Topanou ) and
has limited time to examine the budget: if it misses the deadline for
voting on it, the president can adopt the budget law by decree
(Akindés & Topanou ).
There is also a growing complaint that the professional quality of the
MPs has decreased with respect to the ﬁrst years of the Renouveau
Démocratique and that the debate in parliament has been impoverished
by partisan struggles and by neo-patrimonial practices (Political analyst
 Int.; Beninese MP B  Int.). Beninese MPs, whose allowances
are already insufﬁcient to perform their institutional duties (Political
analyst  Int.; Beninese MP A  Int.; Beninese MP B  Int.)
are under constant pressure to ﬁnd additional resources necessary to en-
tertain a political clientele. This situation encourages MPs to gravitate
towards the political side that has more to offer, usually the governmen-
tal coalition (Engels et al. ). Personal allegiances and coalitions in
the Beninese parliament are often shifting, and the phenomenon is
decried under the label of ‘political transhumance’ (Awoudo ;
Beninese MP B  Int.). A controversial practice allowed by the
Beninese law has also been the so-called vote by delegation – the possi-
bility for an absentee MP to have a colleague voting on his or her
behalf. It has been alleged that vote by delegation has facilitated the cor-
ruption of MPs (Political analyst  Int.).
The parliament has also played the more ‘soft’ role of transmitting
recommendations from pressure groups, such as syndicates or employ-
ers’ associations, to the government (Beninese MP B  Int.;
Entrepreneur representative,  Int.). The organisations having
access to the parliament, however, represent only a small fraction of
Beninese potential taxpayers – workers and entrepreneurs of the
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formal sector (Parliamentary assistant  Int.). This points to the
second main issue affecting the connection between the principle of re-
presentation and taxation in Benin: the fact that few people pay taxes.
At the beginning of the s, the fact that there were few national tax-
payers helped the new Beninese democratic regime to carry out reforms
with little opposition (Senior tax ofﬁcer A  Int.). The number of tax-
payers increased in the subsequent years, but the bulk of national-level
taxation is still extracted by a small number of people and enterprises.
According to a senior tax ofﬁcial, about ,–, public employees
and – large enterprises currently provide more than % of in-
ternal revenues (Senior tax ofﬁcer C  Int.). More citizens arguably
pay local taxes, but, given the very recent introduction of decentralisation
in Benin, it is difﬁcult to evaluate the importance of these taxes. The ﬁscal
administration has taken a few initiatives to encourage small enterprises to
register and pay taxes. In , a decree providing for the creation of
Centres de Gestion Agréés (CGA), aiming at supporting small enterprises
and encouraging their formalisation, was adopted. However, in , only
two centres had been created and only  enterprises had adhered to
the initiative (Gnansounou et al. ). There are reasons to believe
that the objective of broadening the tax base has not been pursued
with the same vigour as that of increasing tax revenues in the short
term, all the more so as the tendency to concentrate on a small
number of taxpayers has been in line with global tax reform trends
(Fjeldstad & Moore : ). For instance, the tax on the registration
of enterprises, abolished in  with the aim of encouraging small enter-
prises to enter the formal sector, was reintroduced barely three years later
(Entrepreneur representative  Int.).
A cause and a consequence of this failure is the fact that Benin has one
of the largest informal sectors of the region. The  enterprise census
undertaken by the Institut Nationale de Statistique et d’Analyse
Economique counted , informal enterprises versus only ,
formal enterprises (INSAE : ). In , the informal sector
employed ·% of the active population of Benin. Although a
number of taxes are applicable to the informal sector, in practice its con-
tribution to ﬁscal revenues is very small. According to an ofﬁcial estimate,
revenues from the informal sector represented in  less than % of
total internal taxes collected by the DGID (Republic of Benin ).
In the public debate democracy has been accused of having favoured
the over-expansion of the informal sector by encouraging a laissez-faire
attitude, but in fact the boom of the informal economy appears to have
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taken place before the transition to democracy (Igué & Soule ;
Republic of Benin ).
Impressions that the informal sector was smaller under Kérékou stem
rather from the fact that at the time the informal economy was kept
out of public debate. INSAE ﬁgures suggest that it has shrunk rather
slightly since democratisation, from representing ·% of enterprises
in  to ·% in . This trend has been mainly due to the expan-
sion of the formal private sector, which employed only ·% of the
Beninese workforce in  and now represents % of the workforce
(INSAE : ). Up to now, the narrowness of the tax base has
limited the possibility that citizenship and state-society relations could
be reinforced by the way in which revenues are collected (Fjeldstad &
Moore : ). Moreover, the small number of registered taxpayers
that sustain the bulk of taxation feel increasingly overburdened
(Entrepreneur representative  Int.) and there are signs that a per-
verse circle may be in motion, with ﬁscal pressure itself becoming a disin-
centive for informal economic operators to enter the formal sector
(Governance consultant  Int.).
T O W A R D S A D E V E L O P M E N T A L F I S C A L S Y S T E M ?
The weakness of the political representation of the taxpayers does not
mean that democratisation has not played any role in Benin and does
not have the potential to inﬂuence positively the future evolution of tax-
ation. Indeed, several Beninese stakeholders point to a positive effect of
democracy on taxation, although this inﬂuence has taken place in a
mediated and indirect manner. This section identiﬁes alternative chan-
nels neglected by current theories through which democracy has posi-
tively affected taxation in Benin. In Benin, democracy appears to have
facilitated tax reform by increasing the legitimacy of the state; it has
encouraged a non-coercive approach to taxation through the diffusion
of a non-authoritarian ethos among tax and custom ofﬁcials; and has
prompted an open debate about appropriate tax policy by guaranteeing
freedom of speech and association.
During the transition phase, democratisation was an enabling factor
for ﬁscal reforms. The legitimacy enjoyed by the post- democratic
governments, as well as the momentum created by the Conférence des
Forces Vives, helped with pushing ahead the reforms and in establishing
a relationship of conﬁdence between the Beninese government and the
IFIs (Senior tax ofﬁcer B  Int.; Senior tax ofﬁcer A  Int.).
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According to senior tax ofﬁcers, democratisation also facilitated the
effort to bring the tax administration closer to the taxpayers (Senior
tax ofﬁcer A  Int.). Tax reform in Benin has aimed, at least on
paper, at making the administration less distant from citizens and
more consent-based, with initiatives such as the introduction of easier
procedures to pay taxes and the creation of an ofﬁce for small enter-
prises. The ofﬁcial ideology of the tax administration has become one
of treating taxpayers as ‘partners’ and ‘clients’ (Senior tax ofﬁcer B
 Int.).
The picture is nuanced, because these reforms followed a rather stan-
dardised global pattern, and similar solutions were applied in the same
years by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries (Fossat & Bua
). The process of paying taxes in Benin has remained a cumbersome
one and the tax and custom administrations after democratisation are still
plagued by diffuse corruption and embezzlement (Bako Arifari : ).
Several recent surveys have found that the tax administration enjoys a very
low level of trust (Afrobarometer : f; INSAE : ).
However, the formal embrace of a consensual approach seems to have
had some positive effects. While the literature neglects custom duties,
because it does not consider them a form of high quality taxation, the
case of the Beninese custom administration shows that reforms aiming
at making taxation more consent based can enhance the effectiveness
also of this type of taxation. Under the Kérékou single party regime,
the current Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects
(DGDDI) (the custom administration) was militarised and was seen as
responsible ﬁrst of all for security. Little importance was given to its eco-
nomic and ﬁscal role. In , the new democratic regime took the de-
cision to disafﬁliate the customs administration from the security forces
(Custom ofﬁcer  int.). A second reform of the custom administra-
tion was undertaken in  with the simpliﬁcation of custom proce-
dures and the institution of a guichet unique (one-stop window) at the
Cotonou Port. These reforms have helped the custom administration
to collect more revenues, and there are grounds to think that the demo-
cratic environment has been a key factor in determining a positive
outcome (Researcher  Int.).
The ongoing emergence of a debate on what has become known as
ﬁscalité de développement (developmental taxation) points to another pos-
sible causal channel through which democratisation could have a posi-
tive inﬂuence over revenue collection and statebuilding. The
expression ﬁscalité de développement is used by taxpayers, employers,
donors and civil society activists to indicate a taxation system that is
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compatible with the promotion of economic growth and productive in-
vestment (Governance consultant  Int.). Although it shares some
aspects of the global tax reform agenda, the developmental taxation
agenda does not focus on the expansion of tax revenues per se and
takes a longer-term and more sustainable approach. The main points
of the developmental taxation agenda are the enlargement of the
ﬁscal base, the struggle against corruption in the tax administration,
the promotion of ﬁscal equity and the modernisation of the ﬁscal
system (Gnansounou et al. ).
Under authoritarian rule, there was no public debate in Benin over
ﬁscal issues. Moreover, certain topics, such as the informal sector and
its expansion, were treated as taboo and ignored by the public adminis-
tration. In contrast, the process that has led to the emergence of the
developmental taxation debate in Benin shows that, even when institu-
tionalised channels of representation and dialogue between the state
and the citizens show limitations, freedom of speech and association
can allow civil society and interest groups to express their views and
put on the agenda issues that were previously neglected.
The developmental taxation debate has emerged in Benin in the last
decade. During this period, the limits of technocratic ﬁscal reforms have
become increasingly perceptible, and ﬁscal revenues have expanded at a
slower pace or have contracted.
Public sector employees and formal sector entrepreneurs, who cur-
rently sustain most of the burden of taxation are becoming increasingly
mobilised. The syndicates, which in Benin essentially represent the
public sector, have protested several times, asking for the reduction of
taxation on salaries (Governance consultant  Int.). In , the
Conseil National du Patronat du Bénin (Beninese National Council of
Employers, CNP-B) and the Conseil des Investisseurs Privés du Bénin
(Council of the Private Investors of Benin, CIPB), together with other
associations representing the formal private sector, have launched a
Working Group on Fiscal Issues (Groupe de Travail Fiscalité ).
Their initiative was a response to what they saw as increasing ‘ﬁscal har-
assment’ on the part of the state, stemming both from the state’s need
for funding and from corruption in the tax administration
(Entrepreneur representative  Int.). The Working Group, which
includes several associations of independent professionals, such as
lawyers and pharmacists, and a team of international consultants, pre-
pares a platform of ﬁscal proposals every year, which is presented to
the Ministry of Economy and Finance and to the Finance Commission
of the National Assembly (Groupe de Travail Fiscalité ). Another
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preoccupation of the formal private sector has been to encourage the
government to expand the tax base by engaging with the informal
sector in a pragmatic manner. The CNP-B, the CIPB, the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Benin and two other associations have spon-
sored a major enquiry over the informal sector, involving more than
 enterprises (Igué & Puech ).
External partners have also been sensitive to the problem. The
German Cooperation Agency GIZ has a representative in the Working
Group on Fiscal Issues and the European Commission has co-ﬁnanced
an evaluation of the Beninese ﬁscal sector (Raynaud et al. ). The
experts’ report came to quite critical conclusions about the Beninese
ﬁscal system. It argued that reforms had not been deep enough and
that the Beninese ﬁscal system had yet to be adapted to the contempor-
ary economic reality of the country. It blamed the lack of transparency
created by the number of taxes and insufﬁcient information. It also
pointed out the excessive ﬁscal pressure on productive activities
(Raynaud et al. ).
Prompted by these private sector initiatives, the Ministry of Economy
and Finance has been obliged to open an institutionalised channel of
dialogue, the Public-Private Platform for the relaunch of the economy,
established by a  law (Republic of Benin ). The Platform
meets every six months under the chairmanship of the Minister of
Economy and Finance and every two months under the chairmanship
of the Cabinet Director of the Ministry. It includes representatives of
the different directions of the Ministry on the government side, and,
on the side of the private sector, the CNP-B, the CIPB, the Chamber
of Commerce and other professional associations.
As representatives of the formal private sector themselves recognise,
the Boni Yayi administration has shown openness to dialogue
(Entrepreneur representative  Int.). Up to now, however, the
outcome of initiatives aiming to promote a better taxation system has
been mixed. A new reform has also been adopted in , with the cre-
ation of a single income tax on physical persons. From the viewpoint of
ﬁscal sociology theory, this is particularly signiﬁcant, as personal income
taxes are considered ‘high quality’ taxation par excellence. However,
and in spite of the fact that the introduction of an income tax was a
long-term demand of the formal private sector, the Working Group
on Fiscal Issues has complained that the new Impôt sur le Revenu des
Personnes Physiques (IRPP) has been designed in an excessively bur-
densome way (Groupe de Travail Fiscalité ). Moreover, there has
been up to now no attempt to include actors from the informal sector
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in the Public-Private Platform or to open with them another institutiona-
lised, regular channel of dialogue. This would not have been impossible,
as some informal sector operators, such as artisans or motorcycle taxi
drivers, have their own recognisable professional associations.
The government appears to be caught between pressures to make tax-
ation more fair and sustainable and short-term concerns with raising rev-
enues, partly encouraged by IMF and UEMOA targets. The potential
reduction of custom revenues stemming from the introduction of the
ECOWAS CET and the conclusion of the EPA is creating further pres-
sure. However, the consequences of these developments could be nega-
tive as well as positive. The threat of a loss of external revenues could
push the government to take more seriously the problem of the expan-
sion of the internal tax base. While the informal sector used to be a
‘blind spot’ in the past, the Beninese government has accumulated in
the last few years a considerable knowledge base with regard to it
(INSAE , ; Republic of Benin ) and a new census speciﬁ-
cally targeted at micro-enterprises is in preparation (Senior tax ofﬁcer C
 Int.). The tax administration prefers not to take part openly in
initiatives aimed at improving knowledge of the informal sector, as it
fears that showing too clearly that there is a ﬁscal objective beyond
them could compromise their success (Senior tax ofﬁcer C  Int.),
but closely follows them.
A potential expansion of the tax base through the inclusion of the in-
formal sector necessarily would have to be based on some form of nego-
tiated deal. Thus, in the end, the growing dependence of the Beninese
government on internal tax revenues could lead to the development of a
more meaningful social contract revolving around taxation.
C O N C L U S I O N
The case study of Benin suggests that, even when democratisation leads
in the short term to an increase in the availability of international rents,
democracy is not harmful to a state’s extractive capacities, and that the
transition and consolidation of democracy may be accompanied by a no-
ticeable increase in state revenues. However, it also highlights the fact
that there is no clear and automatic causal connection between democ-
ratisation and effective taxation. The positive effect of democracy
appears indirect and mediated.
Political representation is not likely to have a clear impact on taxation
in contemporary low income democracies because of two factors that
reduce its signiﬁcance. The ﬁrst is the weakness of parliaments and
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the neopatrimonial character of politics in many of these countries. The
second is the small number of people who are effectively taxed in many
developing countries, at least at the national government level. Taxation
for statebuilding, in these countries, means to a large extent broadening
of the ﬁscal base. The main obstacle to effective taxation in Benin does
not seem dependence on rents, but the informalisation of the economy
and its fragmentation in micro-enterprises.
Most gains in terms of expansion of revenues in Benin have been
reaped due to the application of reforms promoted by international
and national technocrats. While theories of the rentier state suggest
that globalisation is likely to have a negative impact on taxation
because it generates rents, the Beninese case also suggests that it
might have the opposite effect, due to the global diffusion of a fairly stan-
dardised ﬁscal reform agenda and international pressures on states to
increase revenues.
The Beninese case suggests, however, that the technocratic path to the
expansion of state revenues, albeit in some respects successful, is not
likely to deliver fully in terms of statebuilding and good governance.
One of the limits of the technocratic approach to reform has been the
inability to expand the tax base, with the consequence that the
burden of the country’s ﬁscal revenues still falls on a small number of
Beninese citizens and enterprises and that the country’s economy con-
tinues to be predominantly informal.
The case of Benin suggests that democracy can have a positive impact
on taxation in two ways. First, democratic legitimacy can help a govern-
ment to push ahead a package of potentially controversial ﬁscal reforms.
Second, the climate of civil freedoms and open debate generated by
democracy can help with putting on the agenda issues that previously
received little attention, such as the impact of taxation on equity and
economic development or the role of the informal sector. Thus, a demo-
cratic environment can create the preconditions for effective ﬁscal
reforms.
As the limits of the technocratic approach have become increasingly
evident in Benin, the space for a more contractual approach to taxation
and for an increasing role to be played by democratic practices and insti-
tutions may be opening. This is evident in the establishment of formal
channels of discussion between the government and major taxpayers
and in the growing debate about a developmental taxation. Indeed,
the case of Beninmay ultimately conﬁrm that, although the formal chan-
nels of democracy may matter relatively little for expanding extractive
capacities, successful taxation depends in the end on the consent of
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the taxpayers and on quasi-contractual relations between them and the
state. Because it allows for public debate and contestation of decisions
taken by the government, democracy may offer a better environment
for a consensual approach to taxation. However, as the positive
inﬂuence of dialogue and freedom of speech does not pass through
the institutional channels of a democratic system, such as elections
and representative bodies, it cannot be excluded that an enlightened
autocratic or semi-autocratic administration may also be able to create
a similar atmosphere of openness and dialogue on ﬁscal issues, while
maintaining an authoritarian grip on other issues.
The case of Benin also lends ground to the hypothesis that a shrinking
of rents and ‘low quality’ taxation, such as custom duties, could encour-
age the state to shift towards more consensual and contractual forms of
taxation. Faced with the menace of a reduction in custom revenues, the
Beninese state will be forced to confront the problem of the ﬁscalisation
of the informal sector. This could be attained only with the collaboration
of informal sector entrepreneurs themselves. While it is still too early to
tell if the government will be able to develop a successful long-term strat-
egy to address these problems, democracy could at the same time con-
tribute to its resolution and be reinforced by it.
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